Cartel agreement: EU imposes 329 million euro fine on Delivery Hero and Glovo

June 3, 2025

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Compliance

The EU Commission has sentenced Delivery Hero SE and Glovoapp23 SA to a total fine of 329 million euros for cartel formation in the market for online delivery services. The decision is remarkable in several respects: on the one hand in relation to the labor law dimensions, on the other hand with regard to the handling of minority shareholdings in competitors.

Cartel structure and central agreements

Between 2018 and 2022, the two platforms coordinated their market behavior through three central agreements. Together, these significantly restricted competition in the online delivery service market:

No poaching of employees: Originally, this was anchored in the shareholder agreement when Delivery Hero acquired a minority stake in Glovo. This developed into a comprehensive no-poach agreement. The companies undertook not to actively recruit employees from the other company. This agreement was not limited to managers, but was extended to a large part of the workforce. This systematically prevented competition for qualified personnel.
Exchange of competitively sensitive information: In several cases, the two companies exchanged confidential data on prices, cost structures, business strategies and operational planning. This information made it possible to strategically coordinate market behavior and prevent independent economic decisions. Particularly in dynamic markets such as the digital platform economy, such an exchange of information can quickly lead to de facto market collusion.
Market sharing in the EEADelivery Hero and Glovo also agreed to avoid geographical overlaps between their activities in the European Economic Area (EEA). This means that a market entry strategy will not be pursued if the other provider is already active in a particular national market. The companies also agreed on potential new entries in order to avoid direct competition. This territorial division effectively amounted to a territorial monopoly and deprived consumers in several countries of choice.

Minority shareholding to conceal cartel agreements

The European Commission's legal assessment is based primarily on Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. These provisions prohibit agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.

The Commission classifies the agreements concluded between Delivery Hero and Glovo as a "single and continuous infringement" of these standards. This classification is based on the systematic combination of the three practices (no-poach agreement, information exchange and market sharing) into a coherent overall anti-competitive plan. The fact that these practices took place over several years and affected the entire territory of the European Economic Area underlines the seriousness of the infringement.

In the antitrust proceedings, the EU Commission also legally assessed the role of a minority shareholding in a competitor. The acquisition of a minority shareholding is in itself permissible under antitrust law. In the present case, however, this shareholding served as a means of facilitating and concealing the votes. Therefore, an in-depth antitrust review was justified. The decision makes it clear that even structural interdependencies between competitors can, under certain circumstances, contribute to the implementation of conduct that violates antitrust law.

Reading tip: American Express must pay 230 million dollars for compliance violations

Civil law claims based on the Antitrust Damages Directive

In addition to the public law sanctions imposed by the European Commission, the decision in the Delivery Hero/Glovo case opens up extensive civil law consequences for injured parties. Third. According to the established case law of the European Court of Justice and on the basis of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU) affected companies or individuals can claim damages before national courts.

Eligible persons: Potential plaintiffs include restaurants that have suffered economic disadvantages as a result of the restricted choice of provider. Or employees whose professional mobility and earning opportunities have been restricted by the no-poach agreement.

Facilitation of evidence: The Commission decision is binding in civil court proceedings with regard to the existence and unlawfulness of the anti-competitive behavior (Art. 9 Regulation 1/2003). The plaintiff only has to prove the individual amount of damage and causality.

Quantification and practical hurdles: Although the legal framework is Guidelines The practical quantification of damages is complex. Economic expert opinions, industry-specific data analyses and, if necessary, the taking of evidence in court are required. However, the Antitrust Damages Directive offers additional instruments such as claims for information and disclosure of evidence.

Collective law enforcement: In some Member States, there is also the possibility of collective actions by associations or class action instruments, which facilitates access to justice, particularly for smaller market participants who have suffered damage.

Relevance for compliance practice

In EU antitrust proceedings, a "no-poach" agreement was explicitly classified as anti-competitive for the first time. This makes it clear that companies are also subject to antitrust obligations in the HR sector. Such agreements lead to a restriction of employee mobility and to distorted market conditions in the "war for talent".

The Commission also clarified that a minority shareholding in itself does not constitute an antitrust violation. However, if this shareholding serves as a vehicle for the exchange of competition-relevant information or for the coordination of strategic decisions, it can pave the way for collusion in breach of antitrust law. Compliance officers must therefore ensure that functional partitions ("Chinese walls") are established and monitored in the case of shareholdings in competitors.

However, the case also shows how companies can actively protect themselves. Both Delivery Hero and Glovo have admitted the allegations and agreed to a settlement as part of the cartel settlement procedure. This resulted in a lump sum fine reduction of 10 %.

The antitrust proceedings underline not least the increasing importance of digital whistleblower systems and market monitoring. The investigation was triggered, among other things, by information from a national competition authority and anonymous whistleblowers. Compliance systems should therefore see internal reporting points not only as a legal obligation, but also as a strategic early warning tool.

Source: Communication from the EU Commission "Commission fines Delivery Hero and Glovo €329 million for participation in online food delivery cartel"

Use this decision as an opportunity to review your internal guidelines, HR practices and shareholding structures. Conduct targeted training on no-poach risks, raise awareness among your specialist departments and check existing shareholder agreements for antitrust pitfalls.

👉 Do you have questions about implementing antitrust-compliant processes in your company? Contact us - we will support you with risk analysis, policy development and training measures.

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